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This exploratory comparative case study seeks to understand challenges and strategies for 
farmer collective action in post-Soviet settings. It does so by examining member relations, 
trust and commitment in two successful dairy cooperatives in western Ukraine: one NGO-
initiated cooperative with a bottom-up organization, and one cooperative developed in liaison 
with a local large-scale agricultural enterprise (LSE). Through qualitative field study data from 
28 interviews, the study shows how the rural institutional context affects cooperative 
initiatives.  
The results indicate that initial and to some extent lingering issues of trust among villagers  
seemingly linked to failed or fraudulent projects and investments of the transition period  
can be an obstacle for cooperatives linked to NGOs. Meanwhile, such trust issues could easily 
be circumvented by the second cooperative through its strong links to the local LSE, which 
could bestow the cooperative with trustworthiness. 
The study also shows how the two cases, due to their origins and support, differ a lot in their 
member relations, including how they handle collective action problems and how members 
identify within the cooperatives. While the NGO-backed cooperative opts for a strategy that 
advocates equity, participation and a strong care for community, the LSE cooperative opts for 
a more vertical, business-like organization, at the expense of some of the cooperative 
principles.  
Pointing to the institutional factors which enable LSE cooperatives, a continued development 
of LSE cooperatives is expected and discussed. Lawmakers may need to distinguish between 
traditional cooperatives and LSE cooperatives in order to secure the needs of both types of 
arrangements. 
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At first glance, one would expect Ukraine to be a perfect breeding ground for 
agricultural cooperatives. Ukraine  
fertile and widest reaches of agricultural land following a rather egalitarian land 
reform after gaining independence in 1991. Although productive, Ukrainian 
smallholders struggle in making their livelihoods profitable. Further development of 
making small-scale agriculture more viable. As in most post-Soviet countries, the 
current level of cooperative participation in Ukraine is exceptionally low by European 
standards. Only 0,4 % of Ukrainian farms are members of cooperatives (Sedik & 
Lerman 2015), compared to the level of cooperative engagement in western 
countries, oftentimes surpassing 50 % (for a review, see Gijselinckx & Bussels 2014). 
Although cooperatives have been studied long and wide, post-Soviet states have been 
largely overlooked, and the area thus requires more attention. Earlier studies aiming 
to explain why Ukraine, eastern Europe and the post-socialist states have lower 
numbers of cooperatives link it to issues of lower trust, or social capital, within the 
region. Scholars suggest different theories as to why it is the case. For example, 
Lissowska (2013) points to the communist experience of the planned economy and 
the influence of totalitarian regimes on civil society as detrimental to the willingness 
for voluntary cooperation and self-organization (Swain 2000). Contemporary 
institutional and legal factors common to the post-Soviet sphere have also been 
suggested as conditions that hamper cooperative organization (Sedik & Lerman 
2015). 
Such earlier studies have provided macro-level perspectives of institutional 
frameworks and path dependent social structures as causes for the weak 
development of cooperatives in the former communist bloc. However, although there 
are difficulties regarding bottom-up social organization in post-soviet states in 
general, cooperatives do form in the region, and some perform well. There are 
ongoing local and international efforts to create and maintain bottom-up structures 
(Bamman & Braganza 2012). In addition, recent research has given attention to non-





countries with a socialist history (Kurakin & Visser 2017). This thesis will explore 
issues of trust and commitment within two differing models of cooperative institution 
building, building on interview data collected during field visits to two research sites 
in Western Ukraine. One research site represents a -
cooperative, aided by a western development cooperation agency. The other 
cooperative is initiated, financed, and supported by a local large-scale farming 
enterprise. 
By investigating two cooperatives that are viable but with contrasting organizational 
characteristics, the micro-level analysis of this study looks into issues of trust and 
commitment within post-Soviet cooperatives. In employing this set-up, this study 
aims to provide better understanding of how cooperatives gain the trust of locals in 
collective action. By mainly focusing on the perspective of cooperative members and 
leaders through interviews, this study seeks to delve deeper into member relations 
than what is merely contractual. 
Among cooperative organizations and scholars, there is an ideal regarding how 
cooperatives should be implemented and function (International Cooperative 
Alliance 2018). This ideal has been traditional Western cooperatives (Efendiev & 
Sorokin 2013; Kurakin & Visser 2017). By examining social relations in cooperatives 
in a non-Western context, this study can show how cooperative initiatives are shaped 
both s well as the local, historical, and social institutions in 
which they operate  an interplay which leads to varying outcomes for both members 
and the economic viability of a cooperative. 
The study contributes theoretically to cooperative studies by furthering discussion 
on how cooperatives develop in relation to their institutional environment. Calls for 
such research have been voiced by Bijman et al (2016: 285). The results of the thesis 
will be used as a basis for a discussion on the future of collective action institutions 
such as cooperatives in Ukraine and the implications of the involvement of large-scale 
agricultural enterprises and international development cooperation in their 
development. Other than contributing to the research field, the results of the study 
could be of use for rural developers and cooperative leaders in Ukraine who are 
interested in bolstering the development of smallholder cooperatives. Such 
development is prioritized by the Ukrainian government (Sedik and Lerman, 2015) 
and the regional office of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO 
2016), indicating the importance placed on cooperatives by key stakeholders. 
The study can also give valuable insights on the challenges of rural development in 
Ukraine today and the future. Since the revolution of dignity of 2014, Ukraine has 




heavily built on the voluntary cooperation of rural dwellers (European Commission, 
2014).   
1.1.  
The purpose of this study is to contribute with insights into the institutional dynamics 
of agricultural cooperatives in post-soviet contexts. The study explores issues of trust, 
member motivations and relations within cooperatives in post-Soviet settings by 
exploring the trajectories of two different models of cooperative establishment and 
development within the cooperative movement in Ukraine. By so doing, the study 
examines and discusses cooperative development in contexts characterized by low 
trust such as the post-Soviet areas, where cooperative development can be regarded 
as a form of institution-building. The overarching explorative question of this thesis 
is to understand:   
 
What are the institutional challenges and strategies of agricultural cooperatives in a 
post-soviet setting? 
To answer this question, three sub-questions are posed: 
I) How do the cooperatives gain the necessary trust to recruit members? 
II) What are cooperative members motivations in joining and staying in 
cooperatives? 
III) How do cooperative members and leaders define their roles and 
relationships within the cooperatives? 
1.2.   
Following this introduction, a literature review is presented, covering the general 
theoretical field of agricultural cooperatives. This is followed by chapter three which 
presents some empirical background relevant to the Ukrainian setting. Chapter four 
presents the guiding theoretical concepts used for the analysis. The fifth chapter 
presents selection, data collection and 
analysis. The sixth chapter covers the empirical findings of the study. Lasty, chapter 
seven provides a concluding discussion of the findings, connecting them to a wider 




This chapter introduces previous research on the nature, function and organizational 
dilemmas of agricultural cooperatives. It begins by situating the re-emerging 
academic and policy interest in this form of organization in the increasing 
requirements on producers in the globalized food system. It moves on to discuss the 
issue of collective action, and identifies mechanisms suggested by previous research 
as incentivizing to cooperative commitment. Lastly, the chapter details some 
challenges and gaps in existing research.  
2.1.  
In the current globalized food system, producers rely ever more on distant markets, 
and power has been concentrated around the intermediate positions in the supply 
chain (Clapp 2016; Pesche & Losch 2016). For smallholder farmers, it is increasingly 
important to attract buyers that provide pathways to these markets. In academia and 
 
giving them important market access (Bijman 2016). Bigger producers and 
cooperatives can more easily ensure the large volumes and certain standards that 
powerful intermediaries require (Pesche & Losch 2016).  
Agricultural cooperatives have been widely studied and are recognized as 
organizations that can bring benefits to both their members and indirectly to the 
communities in which they operate. A central argument for strengthening the 
formation of cooperatives in Ukraine and other countries with smallholder poverty 
relates to the increased income they can bring to smallholders. Cooperatives have 
earlier been shown to lower transaction costs1 by enhancing market access and 
providing better price information (Bamman & Braganza 2012; Bijman 2016). 
 
1 Transaction costs are understood as the general costs the arise in order to participate in the market 





Furthermore, economies of scale can be obtained through joint marketing, packaging, 
and transportation of goods (Hanisch 2016). Likewise, transaction costs are also 
prevalent when the farmer is on the buying side of a transaction. Thus, cooperatives 
can also work to lower the costs of market participation by buying inputs, supplies 
and extension services in bulk and sell to members without profit margins. In addition 
to the direct economic benefits that cooperatives can bring to members, studies have 
also noted wider effects in the communities in which cooperatives reside, such as 
higher prices even for non-members (Cotterill 1987; Bijman et al. 2012; Hanisch et al. 
2013) and strengthened social capital (Blokland & Schuurman 2016). It should 
however  difficult to fathom, 
and  
which is inconclusive (Hanisch 2016). More research is needed to determine under 
what situations cooperatives can be successful in this regard, paying special attention 
to local circumstances. 
Besides embodying the economic-utilitarian imperative of reducing costs, there is 
also a social and, if you will, a moral dimension to cooperatives, as they promote 
egalitarianism, fairness, and concern for community. Scholars often refer to a duality 
or hybridity of cooperatives as being businesses and social organizations at the same 
time (Albert & Whetten 1985).  
The social dimension of cooperatives relates to the origins of this organizational form. 
The cooperative movement started in the urbanizing and industrial western 
economies during the late 19th century, where the Netherlands and Denmark are 
possibly the primary examples of early and strong cooperative development. The 
social aspect of cooperatives is probably best illustrated in the International 
Cooperative (ICA) widely recognized seven cooperative principles  
(International Cooperative Alliance 2018), which arguably represent common 
perceptions of the baseline functioning of cooperatives: 
1. That membership should be open and voluntary for all who applies, without 
discrimination. 
2. That members should participate in, and have democratic control of, the 
. Elected representatives are responsive to the 
members. 
3. That the members should participate in the economic decisions and the 
capital of the cooperative should mainly be reinvested in the cooperative.  
4. The cooperative should strive for autonomy and independence from other 





5. Cooperatives should give their members education, training, and 
information so that they can contribute better to the cooperative. 
6. Cooperatives should strengthen the cooperative movement through 
cooperation among cooperatives. 
7. Cooperatives should support their communities towards sustainable 
development with policies that approved by their members. 
The duality of cooperatives  being both businesses and social organizations  lies in 
that are unattainable for each individual by themselves (Meinzen-Dick et al. 2004; 
Hellin et al. 2009). Thus, cooperative activities are often regarded as exercises of 
(Bourdieu 1986; 
Coleman 1988; Putnam et al. 1994) are generally deemed essential factors in the 
wellbeing of cooperatives. In fact, it has been shown that social capital can be used to 
explain the economic performance of cooperatives (Groot Kormelinck et al. 2016).  
Indeed, some of the largest threats to cooperative longevity are side-selling and free-
riding behaviour among cooperative members (Ortmann & King 2007; Cechin et al. 
2013). Such behaviour lowers the trust among members, but it also encourages more 
side-selling and free-riding. More resources then need to be allocated by the 
management to counter and control these issues  resources that would otherwise be 
translated to investments or profits to more honest members. 
2.2.  
Trust and social capital are thus essential factors enabling collective action and 
promoting commitment to a cooperative. Commitment in cooperatives can be defined 
is not as good as that provided by an investor-owned 
(Fulton 1999:423). This definition implies that committed cooperative 
members generally would strive to follow the rules set by a cooperative, for instance 
regarding quality standards. Commitment in this sense implies a strong loyalty to the 
as put by Cechin et al. (2013). Cechin et al. (2013) continue by suggesting that 
incentives to cooperative participation can be deconstructed into four fundamental 
mechanisms  market, hierarchy, community, and democratic participation.  
One of the most obvious reason for farmers to form, join and continue to participate 




theoretical research on cooperatives has been conducted from a transaction cost 
economic perspective (Williamson 1979; North 1992; Menard et al. 2007). 
Cooperatives mend the effects of market failure, lack of price information and 
monopsony. Transaction costs, understood as the costs that are related to 
participating in the market, are expected to increase as the distance from seller to 
buyer increases (Dixit 2009).  
Several empirical studies have shown that cooperative participation ameliorates the 
issue of transaction costs while also increasing market access (Wollni & Zeller 2007), 
market participation (Holloway et al. 2000) and higher income (Fischer & Qaim 
2012). Previous research thus suggests that there could be clear economic incentives 
for cooperative members in order to secure their continued participation. However, 
such economic rationality, including the perception of risk and reward is locally and 
culturally situated, and it needs to be understood from a  perspective. 
Another issue highlighted by Cechin et al. (2013) is hierarchy. Cooperatives aim to 
provide easier access to markets, but it does not come for free. As buyers increasingly 
set the terms for trade, agricultural producers need to produce in accordance with 
stronger requirements on both quality and quantity. Standards and certification 
schemes have become increasingly common due both to policy-makers efforts to 
increase food safety and to rising consumer preferences for certified foodstuffs within 
some countries (Bijman 2016; Clapp 2016; Pesche & Losch 2016). Cooperatives that 
seek to attract relevant buyers, may need to implement quality control schemes to 
adhere to new requirements. This is assumed to affect the formal governance and the 
rules of production within the cooperative, as the cooperative leadership too needs 
to implement such quality control schemes and increase requirements (ibid.).  
Quality control schemes can affect member relations within cooperatives in at least 
two ways. First, the potential increase in market access resulting from higher quality 
standards can incentivize motivation for collective action, as members may regard it 
as relevant for economic benefits. Formalization does not only restrict members but 
may also strengthen commitment as members get their rights protected. Members 
may also get a sense of what to expect from the cooperative, and perhaps most 
importantly, rules coupled with effective enforcement may reassure members that 
everyone are contributing to the collective goals (Ahlborg & Boräng 2018).  
On the other hand, increased regulation within cooperatives can also negatively affect 
er a higher level of autonomy in their farm 
operations and therefore be critical towards a cooperative that imposes higher 
degrees of regulation (Hogeland 2006). This can lead to a deterioration of trust, 
solidarity, social cohesion, and identity within the cooperative (Österberg & Nilsson 




insensitive (Freidberg 2008; Moberg 2014). Moberg (2014) critically examines of a 
community producing Fairtrade bananas, where tougher regulation disincentivized 
recruitment and retention in the scheme.  These requirements are seldom take into 
consideration the local biophysical conditions, labour capacities or cultural 
circumstances related to agriculture. Most of all, Moberg (2014) posits that such 
certification schemes suffer greatly if they are poorly communicated. Farmers who 
are subject to the rules may not understand the logic behind such restrictions. 
It is vital for cooperative members to have a shared sense of community  the third 
issue emphasized by Cechin et al. (2013). A sense of community is built around a 
shared notion of identity that relates to the cooperative, as well as shared values, 
norms and knowledge. A sense of community cements trust. Through this process, a 
shared sense of community aligns the opinions and interests among individuals with 
one another (Kogut & Zander 1996). Scholars who have analysed community within 
cooperatives employ the concept of social capital (e.g. Kopytko 2018), which refers to 
this cognitive notion of community but also to connections and networks that one can 
employ within cooperatives. Strong communities also enforce social norms by 
monitoring their members, and sanction or punish behaviours that are deemed 
unacceptable (Murray 2008). To some extent, this concept overlaps with often-
discussed concepts of social capital and its usage within cooperative studies.  
Lastly, Cechin et al. (2013) emphasize the level of democratic participation as an issue 
deemed relevant to members  commitment. In organizations in general, people who 
feel that they are heard tend to be more committed to the organization (Fenwick 
2005). For example, a study conducted by Österberg and Nilsson (2009) show that 
members who are more active in the governance in the cooperative also appreciate 
and are more committed to the cooperative. Members who participate in the 
decisions of the cooperative also tend to have a greater support for the decisions 
taken. With many committed members, cooperatives tend to develop broader 
consensus, which causes decisions to be taken more smoothly and more efficiently 
(Reynolds 1997).  
These four factors  market, hierarchy, community, and participation  are factors 
that have been identified as relevant when understanding member commitment in 
cooperatives. The factors can provide insight as to why and how cooperatives can stir 
commitment among their members. Nevertheless, while these factors shed light on 
the economic context in which the cooperative operates as well as the internal 
characteristics of the organization, the study of institutional context appears to be 
lacking. As Bijman et al. (2016) concludes  more research is needed to understand 




Cooperative studies in general seem to have been mainly studied from an economist 
point of view and with positivist perspective, with quantitative methods and seeking 
to draw generalizable conclusions (Cechin et al. 2013:20016; Groot Kormelinck et al. 
2016). In such a research climate, institutional contextuality may perhaps have been 
somewhat overlooked (Bijman et al. 2016). 
2.3.  
In the western European conception, cooperatives are ideally akin to social 
movements with a bottom-up organization governed by democratic and socially 
oriented cooperative principles (Morales Gutiérrez et al. 2005)  similar to how the 
first cooperatives were established during the industrialization. The cooperatives 
have played a defining role within the agro-economic history of some Western 
countries like Great Britain, Denmark, and Sweden. Researchers argue that 
cooperatives working along principles of self-organization become heavily reliant on 
social capital (Groot Kormelinck et al. 2016).  
However, Kurakin and Visser (2017) point out that the western story of how 
cooperatives should be initialized and organized is not easily mimicked everywhere 
but is bound to a historical social and economic context. They argue that the general 
cooperative discourse, both by practitioners and academia, favours the bottom-up 
cooperatives akin to the 19th century European experience. Today, some countries 
might need to find their own path of developing cooperatives and not follow the 
Western footsteps.  
For countries with low general trust, a cooperative model centred around farmer self-
organization activity may be hard. Looking to China, for example, cooperatives were 
legalized during the 19 -positive reforms. The government has 
since been very active in the formation of cooperatives, partly due to the low level of 
active, voluntary self-organization of farmers (Hu et al. 2007; Liang & Hendrikse 
2013; Jia et al. 2016). Following more reforms, cooperatives in the country were 
tripled between 2007 and 2010 (Deng et al. 2010). A similar development has been 
shown in Vietnam and today, government backed cooperatives make the backbone of 
the cooperative engagement. Kurakin and Visser (2017) have also shown that 
government backed cooperatives have been successful in the Russian province of 






This chapter has summarized the broader perceptions of and approaches to 
commitment in agricultural cooperatives. While bringing forward important insight 
and pertinent perspectives, this field of research has some limitations. First and 
foremost, the field has had a predominantly positivist perspective giving preference 
to quantitative methods of inquiry (e.g. Österberg & Nilsson 2009; Bijman et al. 2012; 
Cechin et al. 2013). There appears to be very few qualitative accounts of member trust 
and commitment in the existing literature2. While they exhibit important merits, 
quantitative designs do not allow members to elaborate on their participation, 
commitment, 
relations within cooperatives with a focus on motivation and commitment can 
arguably be done more illustratively using qualitative methods. 
This also raises another important issue.  With the ambition to generalize, economist 
researchers tend to overlook the differing environments in which cooperatives are 
situated. Patterns observed among century-old Western European cooperatives 
(some of which have become multinational in size) have been used to formulate 
hypotheses and draw causal conclusions about cooperatives in general (cf. Cechin et 
al. 2013; Bijman 2016; Hanisch 2016). Such cooperatives have little similarities with 
smallholder cooperatives in developing countries, and comparisons even between 
cooperatives in the very heterogenic category of developing countries are difficult to 
justify. Since cooperatives are formed in distinct institutional environments and have 
individual organizational particularities, more studies acknowledging such 
differences are needed. 
Likewise, more attention is needed to acknowledge the implications of cooperatives  
function and its interests. Cooperatives can exhibit a wide range of organizational 
characteristics, and it is important to look more in-depth into the implications of the 
traits of a specific cooperative on members relations, commitment, and trust. An 
interesting typology for an analysis of this nature is provided by Bijman et al. (2016) 
who point to distinctions in whether cooperatives are supplying their members with 
input and credit, or if they are marketing their produce; whether they are driven 
mainly by social, political, or economic aims; and whether the scope of operations are 
on local, regional or national scale. 
 
2 An ethnography of the motivations among Palestinian women to participate in a Fairtrade cooperative 




This chapter will contextualize cooperative development in Ukraine and other 
republics formerly in the USSR from a historical point of view.  The agricultural and 
rural structure are briefly 
  
3.1.  
Ukraine is characterized as a country of huge agricultural potential, possessing as 
much a chernozem (black soil) (Mamonova, 
2015). Like western Europe, Ukraine and Tsarist Russia had a strong cooperative 
movement in the late 19th century (Golovina 2012). However, such voluntary 
collective action was disrupted by the forced Soviet collectivisation starting in the late 
1920s. The family farms were clumped together, developing large units of collective 
or state ownership (kolhosp and sovhosp, respectively3). These were designed to 
supply the rest of the Union with food and the state with credit, mainly relying on 
economics of scale to increase productivity. Beside these megafarms, rural 
inhabitants retained smaller plots of land, which continued to be of great importance 
for subsistence needs under the Soviet regime. However, the two agricultural sectors 
were not secluded, but integrated in a symbiotic social and economic relationship  
divergent yet integrated (Small 2007). These agricultural units also offered official 
services for farm workers such as libraries, nurses, and cantinas (Visser 2010). 
 
3 Soviet large farms were based on two types of entities  the collective farm (Russian Kolkhoz, or 
Ukrainian Kolhosp) and the state farm (Russian Sovkhoz or Ukrainian Radhosp). Though there were some 
differences in regard to how wages were paid, the difference was mostly nominal. Kolkhoz / kolhosp 
remains the denominator, not only for both these types of entities in everyday speech, but for the modern 
private enterprises that exist today. As it is used interchangeably, it will be clarified throughout this 






Beside these obligations, the collective farm also had other services they provided to 
peasant workers on an informal basis. The Soviet planned economy had deficiencies 
and imbalances that gave way for an extensive informal economy to balance out the 
inherent flaws (Swain 2000). In Soviet agriculture, the collective farms provided 
lacklustre cash payments to their workers, yet they provided vital support for the 
household agriculture  the peasant workers could use collective machinery for tilling 
their household plots and then sell the produce from the plots 
channels. They could also acquire livestock and let them graze on collective pastures 
(Visser 2010:289). As such, the collective farms were functioning as hubs for 
resources to stream to and from the household sector. It must be noted, that the 
official stance of soviet apparatus was to not look keenly on these transactions, as 
they were conducted outside the reach of the planned economy (Visser 2010; Altman 
& Morrison 2015). 
The development of the informal economy put managers and directors in a critical 
position. In the end, it was they who actively and personally had to accommodate and 
sanction the exchanges, thus giving them a gatekeeping role. They became important 
figures in the social and economic life of the collective farms and the villages of which 
they were composed. For farm members, it was important to be on good terms with 
the directors and managers if they were to expect to get any help (Humphrey 1999; 
Visser 2010). 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the following Ukrainian independence, the 
agricultural sector was reformed, and collective farmland redistributed. Seven million 
former collective farm workers, or 16 % of the Ukrainian population, were given the 
right to own a fragment of their former kolhosps in a somewhat egalitarian way, with 
hopes of establishing a western model of family farms (Lerman et al. 2007). Each 
landowner received a land share giving right to a certain size. In addition to this, rural 
inhabitants have retained the still-in-use household plots of about 0,5 hectares 
(Mamonova 2015). Following the redistribution, the Ukrainian parliament forbid the 
sales of land in order to hinder land grabbing, which is still in effect.  Reforms to slowly 
lift the moratorium are expected to be in effect in July 2021. (KyivPost 2020). 
Though farmland could be divided among the former workers, farm structures could 
not. Few landowners have since harnessed their newly won farmland, rather they 
rent it cheaply, often in natura, to private companies who operate through former 
kolhosp facilities (Sedik & Lerman 2015). Through this process, the country has 
retained a land use model similar to the earlier Soviet agriculture from the former 
century. Kuns (2017b) argues that the structure of intensive, large-scale agriculture 
interlinked with small-scale household production has managed to outlast the years 
of Soviet rule and has seamlessly re-emerged in a capitalist shape, even following 




the large farm enterprises today. 
the large-scale agricultural enterprises, there is a small minority of family farms in 
the country. 
The dismantling of the collective farms meant that the household agriculture also lost 
the access to technology, know-how and the market channels necessary for its 
development (Mamonova 2015; Visser et al. 2015; Kuns 2017b). However, the social 
that the collective farms and their directors had, has since passed over 
to the state, but in effect private large-farm enterprises continue to provide a 
modicum of services on in informal basis. To smallholders, they can offer cheaper 
inputs such as agrochemicals that they buy in bulk for their own use or sell straw and 
fodder that are by-products of their main operations.  Though the social responsibility 
of the modern LSEs is a continuation of an institutionalized way of handling things 
from the past, it is also under ongoing negotiation.  
For example, during Soviet times, full employment and thus over-employment made 
the threat of being laid off less significant. After transition, some LSE directors have 
responsibility
wages and renting land from smallholders, for example (Visser 2010). On the other 
hand,  the influx of foreign capital in Ukrainian agricultures, where foreign companies 
and their management have difficulties understanding and accepting expectations on 
delivering these informal services to peasants (Kuns 2017a).  
However, the general consensus among scholars is that the large-scale enterprises 
(LSEs) and their relations of exchange with the small scale sectors, however lopsided, 
has been essential for small scale agriculture to prevail past transition in Ukraine and 
Russia (Lerman et al. 2007:79; Visser et al. 2015).   
Another article, focusing on production cooperatives4 in Russia argues that many 
such cooperatives are surprisingly competitive, due to the power that cooperative 
managers able to keep costs down. The authors theorize that such cooperatives were 
able to make lesser reinvestments into the cooperative and pay relatively low wages. 
Members accepted such policies in order to maintain the social fabric that the 
cooperatives and villages constituted. (Nilsson et al. 2016) 
 
4 Production cooperatives are cooperatives that build on the idea that the members join their productive 
assets (like land) in order to work together. In many ways, they are the legal descendants of the Kolhosps, 
and function similarly in many ways. The production cooperatives never managed to ascertain their 




The importance of managers in such production cooperatives have been noted in 
academia earlier, with discussions on the remnants of collective farms, not only in its 
facilities but in its organization. It has been suggested that the power traces back to 
the Soviet collective farms, where the managers were important in administering the 
informal economy of services and trade between individual smallholders/kolhosp 
workers and the kolhosp (for a review of this academic debate, see Nilsson et al. 
2016). 
3.1.1.  
Ukrainian legal definitions for agri-cooperatives follow the western cooperative 
paradigm at large, dividing cooperatives into production and service cooperatives 
(Parliament of Ukraine 2004). Agricultural production cooperatives are based on the 
idea that members unite their labour and tenure into bigger units of production. 
Essentially being the post-communist legal (and perhaps, spiritual) successor of the 
kolhosps, they have to a large extent disappeared from the Ukrainian countryside 
(Sedik & Lerman 2015). By contrast, such units managed to contribute to 17 % of the 
agricultural production in neighbouring Russia during 2008 (Nilsson et al. 2016).  
Service cooperatives on the other hand, correspond better with the western 
conception of what a cooperative is: an organization of independent actors that create 
services such as marketing, processing, or supplying to their members (Sedik & 
Lerman 2015). In Ukraine, these constitute the lion  share of the number of 
cooperatives, although the number that are functioning cooperatives can be disputed 
(Borodina 2013; Sedik & Lerman 2015). However, cooperatives are expected to only 
stand for 1 % of agricultural GDP (FAO 2020). 
3.1.2. 
 
Studies on cooperatives within transition economies of the former USSR are not 
common. In an analysis of European Values Survey data, Lissowska (2013) concluded 
that the low level of civic engagement and cooperative organization in eastern Europe 
is linked to the heritage of forced collectivism imposed by the communist regimes. 
The Soviet governance model promoted vertical relational lines of paternalism and 
clientelism instead of the horizontal model favoured in the liberal-democratic 





This analysis is in line with several earlier studies pointing to how path dependency 
from Soviet rule limits the potential positive impact of social capital on cooperation. 
Among others, Swain (2000) argues that the planned economy undermined trust, 
while Paldam & Svendsen (2000) argue that political repression and totalitarianism 
caused what they 
informal social networks (discussed earlier) that emerged in the repressive 
environment, necessary to counteract and balance the issues of distribution of 
resources and services within the planned economy, but after transition prevails in 
forms more akin to corruption. 
Other scholars (Borodina 2013; Sedik & Lerman 2015) avoid these path-dependent 
reasonings and 
lack, or failure, of political measures taken to encourage the establishment of 
cooperatives. Policy support for cooperative formation has mainly consisted of 
only formed to access the subsidies without adhering to the fundamental cooperative 
principles. 
3.1.3.  
Two case studies have been identified that specifically study cooperatives at micro 
level in Ukraine. Kopytko's (2018) 
. The study finds that initially, the strong internal ties within villages 
hindered peasants to join cooperatives as these networks perpetuated negative 
attitudes on cooperation also found in other studies. However, as the cooperative 
slowly grew, the economic benefit became more evident to the sceptics, and 
eventually persuaded others into joining. This in turn formed positive feedback loops 
of quickly growing trust within the cooperative. Similar patterns have also been noted 
in a study of Ethiopian coffee cooperatives (Groot Kormelinck et al. 2016), where trust 
among individuals increased when the effort put into collective action resulted in 
economic benefits. 
In the Ukraine case study, Kopytko (2018) further notes the relevance of an 
enthusiastic and persistent cooperative leader as essential to the success of the 
cooperative. These findings are also supported by Turner et al. (2013) whose case 
study report of a development initiative in the horticultural sector in southern 





Informed by the earlier contextual and theoretical background chapters, this chapter 
will present the theories and concepts that guide this thesis. The thesis aims to 
explore the challenges and strategies of cooperatives in gaining the trust of their 
members and building commitment among them.  
For this thesis, the establishment of cooperatives are perceived as a process of 
building institutions for collective action. While an institutional focus can imply a 
focus on formal institutions, such as rules, this thesis will focus on the softer, social 
institutions that are often called informal. It will perceive institutions mainly as being 
and ontological status of taken-for-
Tolbert, 1997: 99). 
As such, and as shown by Kurakin and Visser's (2017) argument regarding top-down 
cooperatives in countries with a socialist past  such institution building can vary 
contextually. Local realities may well influence the outcome of the institution building 
strategy, regardless of whether such a strategy was deliberate or not.  
Although an institutional focus often implies a focus on structures, understanding 
institution building in a low-trust context cannot ignore the role of actors, as the lower 
-level factors 
(Zobena et al. 2005:47; Hurrelman et al. 2006). For this reason, this study will also 
have an actor focus beside the strictly institutional.  
The founders of cooperatives in the studied environment must be regarded as 
pioneers. They introduce new forms of organization, and in so doing, they try to gain 
vigate their new organizations in social contexts with pre-
existing norms, rules, and accepted ways of doing things. It is important to understand 






For cooperatives to successfully institutionalize collective action, two core issues are 
apparent in areas of lower trust - first, how do they gain the trustworthiness required 
by villagers to join? And secondly, how can they handle issues of free-riding within 
the cooperative? 
Gaining trust 
Although social capital is often employed concept in cooperative studies, it is tends to 
either used to understand how individuals utilizes networks as a resource (Bourdieu 
1986) or as a positivist concept on macro level (Putnam et al. 1994). For this thesis, 
trust will be of focus instead. Social capital commodifies trust, implying trust and 
social connections as a resource to be exchanged. Luhmann (1968/2005) defines 
trust as a reduction of uncertainty in relations. As such, he defines it more of a process 
rather than an asset to be utilized. Trust replaces calculation of risk in social 
interactions and allows them to become routine.  
For a cooperative, it is necessary that members trust both the management and the 
other members. The management of a cooperative must be deemed competent and 
having the cooperatives best interest in their mind, rather than personal self-interest 
willingness for collective action, members will need to develop trust between 
themselves too. 
Related to the relevance of individuals and strong leaders as well as local 
circumstances  (Weber 1922) neo-
 that have been discussed regarding post-Soviet societies (c.f. Getty 
2013; Szelényi & Mihályi 2019). Although often used to understand political 
governance, patrimonial relations can also be relevant to understand more local 
social relations on community level. The term itself was first described by Max Weber 
(1922) and it relates to how power is centred around one leader and how reciprocal 
exchanges and dependency relations are structured around this individual.  Such 
reciprocal exchange is often personal, densely interwoven, often lopsided, and based 
on intangible and symbolic dynamics of status, loyalty, and deference as much as on 
material exchange  (Pitcher et al. 2009). 
The previous chapter discussed the central position of large-scale agricultural 
enterprises in structuring rural social and economic life  both past and present. 
Attention has also been drawn to the importance and power of managers and 
of the socialist planned economy or, as today, access markets or gain sought-after 
inputs. This relationship displays aspects of patrimonialism, where managers and 




understanding of rural social networks in this context. These factors will be of 
importance in the forthcoming analysis.  
Collective action problems and the concept of commitment 
For collective action to successfully manifest, there are two core problems. One is that 
the organization need to ensure that rules are upheld, usually through an actor with 
the authority and efficiency in enforcing the rules. This is the problem of credible 
enforcement.  The debate regarding the importance of credible commitment and 
credible enforcement - e.g. whether collective action institutions should focus on 
securing democratic mechanisms to handle free-riding problems first is not new 
. Credible commitment is understood as ensuring that 
the institution and its leadership does not use it for personal needs, and that they look 
to the needs of its members. The natural way to ensure this is through democracy, 
which is one core component in Cechin et al.  deconstruction of commitment. 
Do members feel listened to, and do they believe they can influence the decisions 
made in the cooperative? Are decisions otherwise transparent? 
The other way for collective action to happen is through credible enforcement. This 
refers to whether they have ensured that the collective good is safeguarded by 
policies and efficiency in handling free-rider problems. This can also be regarded as 
the level of hierarchy within the cooperative. This includes the extent to which the 
cooperative has common requirements for production, and the extent to which fraud 
can be dealt with effectively. Furthermore, it includes the setting up of boundaries to 
the cooperative. Sometimes democracy and hierarchy can in a contradictory 
relationship, as members may not want to make restrictions on their autonomy, 
which hierarchy often presupposes. 
Organizational identity 
Lastly, Cechin et al. (2013) also notices that cooperative members need to have a 
shared sense of community. A sense of community is built around a shared notion of 
identity that relates to the cooperative, as well as shared values, norms, and 
knowledge. A sense of community cements trust. Through this process, a shared sense 
of community aligns the opinions and interests among individuals with one another 
(Kogut & Zander 1996). Strong communities also enforce social norms by monitoring 
their members, and sanction or punish behaviours that are deemed unacceptable 
(Murray 2008).  
Another way of further understanding the concept of community is through the idea 
of organizational identity (Albert & Whetten 1984). In their seminal work, Albert and 




individuals can have multiple and even conflicting identities. As rural cooperatives 
are conceived as simultaneously being both businesses and social organizations, rural 
cooperatives can be regarded as fulfilling two roles at once. Linked to these two roles 
and that these roles are accompanied by two opposing value systems, or identities 
(Foreman and Whetten, 2002). Organizational identities, offering an explanation to 
cooperatives understand and make meaning of their own roles, responsibilities, and 
relationships. Furthermore, organizational identity can be used to understand how 
the cooperative as well as the goals of the organization and how it contextualizes itself 
within a wider society. 
This theoretical discussion based in general collective action dilemmas and 
cooperative development as well as more locally relevant theories regarding post-
soviet institutions served the basis for the research and functioned as a backdrop for 






members. We can regard them as following common definitions of what a cooperative 
is, and focus on capturing the formal, statutory rules that restrict their members for 
example. Contractual matters such as rules, roles, regulation et cetera, are of interest. 
By comparison, a constructivist or interpretivist perspective, would regard 
cooperatives as being perpetually performed and accomplished by their members 
through social interaction, negotiation, and agreement. Hence, in this view 
cooperatives true essence is not real but socially constructed. 
This thesis will however focus on member relations, and thus on how the members in 
the cooperatives relate to each other, the management as well as rules and 
governance within cooperatives. Based on the recurring themes that have been laid 
out, and as mentioned in the literature review, we can say that cooperatives vary. This 
makes it difficult to reach any objective understanding of cooperatives.  
The epistemological positioning of this thesis will be so called critical realist. In this 
lies the assertation that our knowledge and understanding of the world is layered. 
There is in fact a real world; but empirical study cannot always fully and objectively 
reach knowledge about it. Our senses are limited and many times subjective. 
However, by studying the subjective we can glimpse at the real. 
5.2.  
The study has been conducted with a qualitative methodology. This decision was 
made from both epistemological and practical concern. Earlier studies have assessed 





Cechin et al. 2013) and thus at times lack detail and depth in describing the social 
processes and reasoning of the population at study. In the theoretical chapter, the 
argument was made about the value of putting the focus on 
on their trust and how they understand their roles (and others) within the 
cooperatives. This study will aim to bring the participants first-hand experience and 
reasoning of cooperative successes and failures to the fore and elucidate how 
cooperative members use and value their formal and informal relationships and 
networks (Dudwick et al. 2006). This reasoning cannot be easily unearthed through 
quantitative, survey-based enquiry. 
Beyond the theoretical relevance of employing a qualitative approach, quantitative 
research tools could not be employed in the research environment for this study, 
notwithstanding the potential value of such methods to strengthen reliability and 
generalizability of empirical claims. This is due to the rarity of cooperatives in 
Ukraine, the little research has been done on the subject as well as the fact that 
reliable datasets could not be found. The practical feasibility of quantitative data 
collection made such an approach fall outside of the scope of this thesis. This 
necessitated a more explorative approach and further strengthened the rationale 
behind opting for a purely qualitative approach. 
5.3.  
This thesis examines two cooperatives. A fundamental choice was made early on in 
deciding to study successful  cooperatives. Due to the previously reported 
phenomenon and the discussion on the difficulties in 
establishing cooperatives in Ukraine (Borodina 2013), it was deemed important to 
study cooperatives that had produced at least a minimum of economically meaningful 
services for their members. Trust and commitment can only be meaningfully studied 
in a setting where these sentiments and attitudes can genuinely arise, and extremely 
poor economic performance or even lack of tangible and real activities for members 
would predicably be associated with low trust and lacking commitment.  
This was also the reason why it was important to avoid areas where the ongoing war 
in eastern Ukraine could have disrupted cooperative development. Lviv Oblast in 
western Ukraine had seen less economic downfall since the war than many other 
places (The Economist 2016). 
Once one relevant cooperative had been identified, a contrasting case was included 
with a view to enable a test of tentative theories and hypotheses to and draw better 




cooperatives that differ with regards to geography and sector  one dairy and one 
horticultural for example. However, this would mainly imply a difference between 
cases in the market and economic incentive for cooperative engagement, rather than 
potential differences in the institutional characteristics of interest to this study. 
Instead, since the main focus of this thesis is member relations, the second 
cooperative was identified with concern for contrasts in organizational type and 
history.  
The first selected case was a dairy cooperative built -
horizontal organization, backed by a with foreign development organization offering 
expertise, education, and investments  western- . The 
contrasting case was built in a more vertical manner, tightly linked to a large-scale 
agricultural enterprise (LSE), with close personal ties to the enterprise director and 
local strongman  , as some Ukrainian professionals 




Number of members 356 1195 
Year established 2011 2015 
Cooperative type Conventional J  
Primary product Milk Milk 
Services provided Gathering, marketing, milk fat 
bonus, insemination, veterinary 
services, somatic analysis, credit, 
pasture management, forage 
Gathering, marketing, insemination, 
milk fat bonus 
Catalyst and financier Foreign NGO Local Large-scale agricultural 
enterprise 
Oblast centre  (100 km away) Ternopil / Ivano-Frankivsk (~68km 
away) 
Market Several buyers Primarily monopsonist relationship 
with large-scale agricultural 
enterprise 
Membership heterogeneity5 Higher  20 out of 356 
entrepreneurial family farms with 
several cows. 
Lower  1/1195 family farms. 
Base price for milk 4:50 for smallholders, 5:50 for 
family farmers. 50 kopeks for co-
op development. 




5 The main aspect of heterogeneity or conflict of interest among members was considered to be the size 
of the farm, as bigger farms are likely to have other economic interests than smaller ones. 






To investigate the research questions at hand, data was collected during a field study 
in Ukraine from the 4th of April to the 10th of June 2019. Field research was 
conducted at the two cooperatives but in different villages. Colleagues at The Institute 
of Agrarian transformation and reform at the National Academy of Sciences Ukraine 
helped me initiate the study by aiding me in developing the academic discussion and 
by introducing me to material, field contacts and expert knowledge on the issue at 
hand.  
5.4.1.  
The bulk of empirical data for this study was gathered through interviews. The 
interviews followed a semi-structured format, as this allows for a free and natural 
flow of conversation that can generate more vivid answers which can be more 
 (Brinkmann & Kvale 2015). It also made 
it easy to be flexible and pick up on themes, events or other parts of answers that are 
deemed relevant to the research questions. 
The semi-structured interviews with members focused on following themes: I) 
household farming situation, II) attitude toward and knowledge about cooperatives 
before and after joining, III) attitude toward the rules within the cooperatives, 
perception of the commitment of other members, and trust in leadership IV) 
participation and learning, and lastly V) democracy and perception of conflicts of 
interest within the cooperative6. The length of interviews ranged between 30 minutes 
and 1 hour and 30 minutes. 
In total, 28 interviews were conducted. Of these, 3 were key person interviews, with 
expert insights in both cooperatives. 14 interviews were conducted at cooperative 1 
9  Due to lack of understanding of 
the local language, most interviews were aided by interpreters. Most interviews (20) 
were aided by interpreters with senior experience and was thus transcribed by the 
researcher, with no secondary translation of the recording. However, four interviews 
later had to be re-translated and transcribed with the help of students to regain 
information lost in the translation. Three interviews could be conducted in English. 
The sampling for interview participation 
technique with multiple entry points. Thus, some interviewees were recommended 
 




by the cooperative leadership, while others were recommended by cooperative 
members or approached by simply knocking on doors. Following Brinkmann and 
Kvale's (2015) advice, attention was given to ensuring that several positions in the 
cooperatives were covered, such as extension services, cooperative management, 
members of different villages and farm sizes. 
5.4.2.   
To support material gained from interviews, unstructured ethnographic observations 
in order to pay further attention to intrapersonal relations between farmers, which 
can elucidate further aspects of collective action and cooperativity among farmers 
(Silverman 2015). Unstructured ethnography mainly functioned to support the 
quality of interviews, as they provided valuable contextual information that aided me 
to pose suitable questions. Examples of such ethnography include living on a family 
farm for one week, visiting two different local large-scale agricultural enterprises, and 
many visits to various milk collection points. Such ethnography was written in a field 
note diary. 
5.4.3.   
As language and cultural differences were prevalent, interview material was 
continuously verified with interviewees during and after the interview, as to ensure 
reliable interpretations. Such verification was mainly made in situ with clarifying 
questions, as logistics and language hindered analytical conclusions to be cross-
checked retrospectively. Similarly, after interviews, remarkable or interesting 
statements were discretely discussed with the interpreter, colleagues, and others to 
minimize misunderstanding. 
Another issue with both interviews and ethnography is the relation with the 
participants of the study. To minimize the risk where participants would give 
incomplete or misleading answers for whatever reason, precautions were taken to 
present myself and the study as trustworthy (Silverman 2015). This was done mainly 
by staying in the field for extended periods, as well as cautiously backing up my 
credentials to prove my independence from both authorities as well as the 
cooperative management. 
5.5.   
Qualitative, interview-based research brings several ethical issues to the fore. First 




followed by asking for their consent of participation (Brinkmann & Kvale 2015). This 
was done by both presenting the study while also offering a form to all interviewees, 
detailing how the information is handled as well as the contact details of the 
researcher (Appendix III). Most importantly, interviewees were informed that they 
could withdraw their participation at any time. 
The choice to engage in ethnographic observations implied some difficulties 
regarding consent forms, as observations may be spontaneous and sporadic. There 
were situations where the observations and note-taking were unbeknownst to those 
being observed. For interviews and ethnographic observations, all the participants of 
this study and their villages will be kept anonymous, with only the remote locations 
of the studied cooperatives given. 
Furthermore, the themes of this study can also be sensitive. The examination of social 
trust and relations within a community need to proceed with sensitivity as conflicts 
may be hidden. Example questions or themes can be deemed embarrassing or 




In this section, the empirical findings and theorizing based on these findings will be 
presented. The section begins with a general presentation of the environment where 
the dairy cooperatives operate. Further ahead, the two cases will be presented along 
three themes, regarding the foundation of the cooperative, their strategies to earn the 
trust of villagers and how they work to build commitment among the members and 
institutionalize collective action. 
6.1.  
- one popular theory is 
that its initial meaning is , referring to the political limits of historical 
domains. In Western Ukraine, a sharp border can be easily spotted  however, not 
necessarily political, but geographical. This is where the rugged Carpathian 
Mountains stubbornly remind with their presence on the southwestern horizon, 
where they meet the ocean of grassland that races eastward towards Mongolia. As the 
mountains flatten and fade out into fields, they create small islands; hills that give a 
chance for other endeavours than tilling the steppe. Woodland and pastures, well-fed 
by the rain forced down by the overlooking mountains, plot the landscape. (Excerpt 
from field note diary, present author) 
spring, one can see many peasants, mainly older women, selling a variety of produce. 
trawberries, frizzly herbs, brittle carrots, and 
green onions as well as abundant potatoes. These crops are grown from the small 
strips of land in the immediate vicinity of their houses. There are also foraged 
products such as mushrooms, sorrel and bouquets of lilies-of-the-valley gathered 
from the dew-swept hills, and forests that plot the fields. (Excerpt from field note 
diary, present author) 
And then of course, milk. Sold in washed out and re- milk of the 





addition, the people of the market also sell homemade smetana and sir (sour cream 
and fresh cheese). (Field note diary, present author) 
To many city dwellers, the produce of peasants is regarded as genuine, unaltered, and 
eco-friendly. Therefore, they are willing to pay a higher price than the dairy 
-pasteurized milk which often cost about 10 hryvnia per litre (Field 
note diary, present author). The lack of trust for the big dairy companies is evident, 
as many people (perhaps rightfully so) believe that the dairy plants are adding 
vegetable oil and emulsifiers in the milk (Interview 2; Interview 3; Interview 5; 
Interview 24).  
In these street markets, trust is also important to earn customers. This view is shared 
by both peasants and customers (Interview 7). One Ukrainian man I met in a hostel 
told me that he sometimes buys milk from the city markets, but that you must know 
which seller to talk to  some sellers simply buy ultra-pasteurized milk at the 
supermarket and refill their bottles with, in order to earn double or triple the money 
(Field note diary, present author).  
However, although the buyers of raw milk in the city markets value the genuine 
standard. The informal milk is mostly transported and sold without proper 
pasteurization or cooling. At best, it is brought to a quick boil to give it some longevity, 
and then boiled again when it reaches the kitchens of the customers (Field note diary, 
present author). The manual milking and often lacklustre hygienic procedures create 
a friendly environment for bacteria, as the lab assistants in a milk lab warned me.  
Visits to the informal markets show that they can indeed offer opportunities for 
peasants to get good prices for their milk, as well as for other products. However, 
peasants need to have the right circumstances for this to work out. Excess labour in 
the household might play one part, as then time can be spared to travel to markets 
(Interview 15). But most importantly, it is crucial that those who intend to sell in the 
cities are lucky enough to have transport opportunities available or vicinity to these 
markets to make to trip worthwhile, both in time and cost (Interview 9; Interview 16; 
Field note diary, present author). 
Beside the informal markets in the wealthier city centres, which are unavailable to 
many peasants, there is also the more widely available opportunities to sell through 
the formal market, centred around the of dairy plants that are scattered across the 
oblasts. They have milk trucks that visit villages and buy the excess milk from 




The development of the cooperatives in both study sites have originated mainly to as 
a response to the market situation and the practices of the dairy plants in the regions. 
In both the cooperatives, farmers were highly discontent with the situation in which 
dairy plants control the local markets. Many of the informants tell of these issues, and 
a key informant called the whole (Interview 1).  
A central concern for the villagers is the generally low prices that dairy plants pay, as 
they often are the sole buyer within a village or even large parts of a district (raion). 
At site 2, farmers reported the earlier price of the local plant to be 2,8 hryvnia ($ 0,1) 
per litre (Interview 28), a quite low amount compare to the 10-15 hryvnia at the city 
markets. Besides offering a low price, the local buyers and dairy plants also pay 
farmers on an irregular basis. This causes financial stress for smallholders who often 
survive on a day-by-day basis with produce from their cows making up a substantial 
share of their livelihood. 
Another issue regarding the milk market is the shifting needs of the diary plants, and 
the changes in how they value quality and quantity of the milk. The Ukrainian milk 
market grades milk on a five-grade scale (Interview 1). Volume is valued highly, hence 
if two producers of the same quality of milk sell to the same buyer, it is not uncommon 
that the bigger producer will get the highest price (Field note dairy, present author). 
On occasions, the dairy plants pay premium prices (10  11 hryvnia) to bigger 
producers who can supply a large, steady, and quality-consistent supply of milk.  
On the other hand, they can also gather milk of poor quality, even sour milk (Field 
note diary, present author; Interview 1, Interview 5), which they can use for cheese 
production by adding fat, such as palm oil and an emulsifier (Field note diary, present 
author; Interview 5, Interview 24). Many times, the milk plants do not measure 
quality for smallholder milk; and if they do, they might do it on the spot but share the 
results at later notice, or even lie about the results. These irregularities in the specific 
needs of the buyers can cause a volatile marketing environment which gives little 
incentive for individual farmers to strive for quality improvements of their product. 
In one way, this is a rational outcome since the milk trucks that roam the countryside 
are still going to mix the milk from different farmers in one batch. Hence, in 
one 
drop of t  (Interview 16). Hence, the farmers that would 
hand in low quality milk would set the standard for the batch since they can 
contaminate the rest of the milk with bacteria or residues of veterinary medicine. 
Clearly, the smallholders are at a disadvantage, due to the strong position of the dairy 
plants who favour quality and consistency but primarily quantity first. Thus, peasants 
receive a price at the farm gate that is generally around 30 % that of large farm 




develop stable relations between buyers and sellers, but rather, it promotes 
opportunistic behaviour among farmers. This is natural: at the same time as farmers 
rarely get any rewards for providing quality milk, they often get the chance to sell 
poor milk. The dynamic created between smallholders and the milk plants is well 
illustrated by the director of a union of dairy cooperatives, stating: 
 
 One of the main problems or factors which determine and influence on price, is 
the volume of milk, but there is not much pressure regarding the quality of milk. 
-quality milk goes to craft cheese or other craft product 
from small processors. [One cooperative] is selling to a big cheese-producing dairy 
plant, which can process 80-100 tonnes per day. [That milk production plant] say 
that 
during milk processing, we add 
, they 
say.  (Interview 1, April 2019). 
6.1.1.  
The observations made from various interviews at both localities, show that there 
are, from a strict market perspective, opportunities for cooperatives. From the 
interviewed members, there seem to be a wide spread of unfair practices among the 
dairy plants that otherwise control the markets. However, there are some aspects of 
how the milk market is functioning that suggests otherwise.  
As there are few systems in place for incentivizing a striving for quality among small 
holder milk producers, they do not get the tools to increase their income. Instead, the 
main path for a smallholder to increase their income is by being very selective on 
market opportunity. They need to find the right buyer at the right time, and when the 
chance is given, many will try get away with selling sub-par produce. 
This short introduction to the dairy markets of Ukraine served to set the stage for the 
rest of the empirical chapter. As an individual farmer in western Ukraine, two 
segments of markets are available: One is to sell to dairy plants, whose trucks 
ambulate to collect milk at oftentimes low prices, without having effective measures 
or incentives for individual farmers to develop quality. For some peasants living in 
proximity to larger 
ousehold labour situation. The 
general impression of the formal and informal dairy market is that it is in many 







This chapter will display the initial foundations of the cooperatives and the 
motivations their founders had.  
6.2.1.  
The development of the cooperative at Site 1 was largely due to the efforts of one 
active woman with the support of development cooperation provided by a foreign 
development cooperation agency. The woman had been working for 27 years at the 
local kolhosp, through the last decade of the Soviet regime 1980 up until 2007. During 
the last few years of its existence, the then privatized enterprise had failed to pay out 
wages for many years, and thus she explains that she went to the market in nearby 
7 was dismantled in 2007, and everybody was left to their 
she states (Interview 16). Soon, she started to notice that the informal market was 
quite lucrative:  
 
bought milk from my neighbours and still went to the market. I got people who 
shared my views, and we wrote a complaint to the ministry of agriculture. We 
called somebody from the trade union because the salaries were not getting paid. 
And then [a political party] won the election here, we sought support from that 
give any effect. I understood that I could change nothing. I decided to stop doing 
the [work at the kolhosp], as I had more cows and that was how I was getting by. 
When the dairy plant paid villagers 90 kopeks [0.9 hryvnia] per litre, I was paying 
m them, I just 
processed it and sold it. When I came back from the market, people were waiting 
for me [by the train station] because they knew I would bring back some money. 
 
Cooperative director (Interview 17) 
 
7 Throughout my interviews, kolhosp is regularly used to refer to large-scale agricultural enterprises 




Now being the director of the cooperative, she links the foundation of the cooperative 
to the decline of the local large-scale farm, which bad been privatized but kept its role 
as the major local employer. She explains the causes for the cooperative to root from 
the demise of the large-farm enterprise as well as a disbelief in the state ability to 
come to term with the issues she observed. Her ambitions to change matters stem 
partly from a distrust in the capacities of local institutions to create change. This 
ambition materialized in the shape of a cooperative when the foreign development 
NGO had an information campaign at the market and invited her and others for a 
meeting on starting cooperatives. She was interested and decided to join, and things 
started rolling. 
The development of the cooperative seems to go hand in hand with a sense of 
empowerment, or self-realization - the villagers could in fact create change 
themselves. She continues:  
 
pressure from the different rivals around, the milk dairy plants. The director of a 
villagers 
survived, and by hook or by crook we have managed to get this price. 
Director, Brody (Interview 17) 
this success has however been fraught with challenges. The director elaborates: 
 Some
plants, you try to tell them and try to get across with the problems of the villages 
the drain. Five years ago, I had a talk with the director of [one dairy plant]. I tried 
to persuade him to pay four hryvnias rather than three, which was paid at the time. 
I said: The 
will be selling it at that price, and you will have nothing. And my words, in some 
respect, were prophetic, because this plant shut down because of lack of raw 
oligarchs unless we had our own thing. Because currently, all dairy business is 
divided among five oligarchs over Ukraine. 
Director of the Brody cooperative (Interview 17) 
 
It is evident that  story is not only one of simply setting up a cooperative, 
but also of something akin to a social movement or a resistance. Her perspective is 




has opponents in her struggle: the dairy plants and the oligarchs. Most of the people 
in the board seem to share this view of the cooperative. When they talk about the 
cooperative, they tend regard it more as being a social movement or a community 
than a business. The members of the board also regularly refer to the importance of 
the cooperative principles (Field note diary, present author), themselves a testament 
to the social imperatives of cooperative organization. 
This is indicating the importance that board members see in the social dimension of 
cooperatives as a uniting and political force, that runs parallel to the strictly economic 
logic of increasing price for members. 
6.2.2.  
Like the Brody cooperative, the Buchach cooperative had its beginnings with farmers 
who were unhappy with their marketing possibilities in the dairy business. The local 
a dairy plant, was the sole buyer of milk in many of the surrounding villages. The plant 
offered a low price, irregular payment and at a set rate at 2,8 % fat.  
Unlike in Brody, the local large farm was still operating, and as many villagers also 
results showed 4,2 %, and they concluded that they had been cheated on their 
payment. However, just like the Brody cooperative, they lacked the necessary 
knowledge of cooperatives at the start. The current director of the cooperative 
explained the next step: 
 
the world a lot and saw that people united in cooperatives. He was interested in 
milk, as he had 8000 cows, whose milk was [partly] used to feed [his own] calves. 
[He figured] he could buy milk [for this purpose] from the people instead, but he 
wanted to know who he was dealing with - not just one woman here, and another 
one there, but he wanted to have business with an organization, an entity. He also 
 
Director of the Buchach cooperative (Interview 17) 
Instead of getting advice and financial support from an NGO, this cooperative was 
backed by the local LSE director and employer of many of the villagers around. For 
him, this was not only an opportunity to support the communities around, but also 
ensuring that he could sustain a more profitable supply of milk. Interestingly, a 
recurrent leading motivation for the cooperative was to ensure that people can stay 
in the countryside (Interview 17; Interview 24; Interview 25). An advisor from 




cooperative that it was economically important for the large-scale agricultural 
work, which in turn could affect the labour supply of the large-scale agricultural 
enterprise (Interview 25). 
6.3.  
In order for a cooperative to succeed, indeed, any kind of collective arrangement, they 
need to recruit people who believe in the cause. For this purpose, the arrangement or 
its proponents need to gain the trust of locals for them to join. This chapter will 
showcase the respective strategies that the cooperatives used in order to gain that 
trust.  
6.3.1.  
Since its conception in 2011, the Brody cooperative has managed to gather around 
300 members. The current director and the main initiator of the cooperative began 
with recruiting people in her village, enrolling 92 members in the first year. She 
started by asking people with whom she had close ties. In addition to her family and 
friends, having the support of the village mayor also helped to win over new 
members. (Interview 17) 
In the cooperative, the normal way of recruitment was through family ties  if there 
was a relative vouching for the cooperative, it seems to have made recruitment easier. 
Therefore, individuals in the first village could quite easily be recruited, however, 
there seemed to have been a small delay thereafter. In some of the villages in the 
vicinity, there was not the same connection to the founders of the cooperative and 
therefore, they needed more convincing (Interview 17). This indicates the importance 
of personal social trust for recruitment. 
Although having managed to gather around 300 members as of now, it was no simple 
feat  people needed very tough persuasion to be convinced to join, especially when 
the Director tried to convince neighbouring villages. During interviews, members 
often recount stories along these lines when asked about their initial thoughts 
regarding the cooperative. A woman who used to oversee the milk collection recalls 





this [stable] reconstruction for free8
is for free, but 
cooperative takes some money away to pay for all these free things. 
 (Interview 5) 
In a similar vein, another interviewee recalls her vigilance and feelings of uncertainty, 
primarily oriented towards the involvement of the foreign development cooperation 
organization.  




 (Interview 7) 
not solely been a blessing, but also caused some vigilance among many potential 
members. Many interviewees recall that they shared this vigilant attitude to the 
outsiders before joining. Asking the same question to another participant gave me 
this answer: 
 First, we said . But then we asked him to drive us to 
one of the villages. We saw everything with our own eyes, we saw that it meant 
But we were scared - 
according to the law of Ukraine . [Chuckles] We were afraid that we would be 
 
Why did you think it could lead to prison? 
 Because we talked about the sums of money involved and it was about half a 
in this country.  
(Interview 9) 
 
8 The NGO project offered advice, materials, financing and loans for stable reconstructions in order to 




Although she now can laugh at her initial fears, it is evident that this farmer had little 
trust for strangers, hearsay, or abstract promises  it was important for her to really 
see concrete results, thereby gaining confidence, before signing up for an agreement. 
Being able to first see the results of the cooperative in order to become convinced is 
 
These women initial vigilance towards the foreign NGO, one of them being 
instinctively fearful reaction to the legal terminology are illustrative of a low trust 
towards institutions. A family farmer in a nearby village puts this in a historical 
perspective, referring to the restructuring of the economy during the transition era: 
 People here, they got a very bitter experience. There were different shares spread 
by different milk companies and there were problems with their dividends. And 
those milk plants -  
(Interview 11) 
The daughter of the cooperative director 
new-found wish to start a cooperative:  
 
 but she was 
fighting for her idea. 
(Interview 6) 
The farmers relate their low trust to the chaotic and harsh period succeeding the 
breakdown of the Soviet Union. In the early transition period, farmers and others had 
to learn the hard way through facing practices of some actors which at best could be 
miscalculated, vain or hopeless, and at worst, predatory. This is in line with the 
reasoning of Sik and Wellman (1999) who argue that the privatization opened 
opportunities of -communist cake .  The actions of previous actors 
thus linger, and still seem to negatively affect the trust towards new actors in the field. 
foreign cooperation agency seems to 
have caused more caution than confidence in relation to the cooperative among local 
farmers. 
However, as time has passed, the cooperative has grown to become a force to be 
reckoned with. With the growing reputation and eight years of existence, the director 
explains that people now initiate contact with her to join the cooperative (Interview 
16). The number of villages interested is steadily increasing. Nevertheless, it should 




business altogether, which is why growth in member numbers is beginning to 
stagnate (Interview 16; Interview 25). 
6.3.2.  
Interestingly, the cooperative in Buchach does not display any major difficulties in the 
recruitment phase as was the case with the Brody cooperative. When asked about 
why they trusted the cooperative, none of the interviewees seemed to indicate that 
they were cautious before joining.  However, it was difficult to pin down direct 
answers as to why this is the case. 
From a strictly economic perspective, the support of the cooperative could be 
regarded as a reaction to the previous monopsony of the local dairy plant. Farmers 
could not rely on their market knowledge and their ability to bargain to get the best 
price. Had this been the case, they would likely have been hesitant towards the 
membership contract and its binding obligations. Because of the lack of options, 
people may have felt that their business could not get much worse and therefore may 
have perceived the membership contract as an opportunity rather than a risk.  
However, trust is also personal and relational. Although the market was slightly 
different in the Buchach area compared to that of Brody , another explanation can be 
highlighted as to why recruitment went quick and smooth in the Buchach area. In 
every village visited, there seemed to be no trace of distrust among farmers before 
joining; in fact, some were puzzled by questions regarding potential distrust 
rative 
comes from a form of extended trust that they have for the local large-scale 
agricultural enterprise and the director of that large-scale agricultural enterprise. 
In most of the villages visited, many inhabitants (and therefore, cooperative 
members) also worked at the large-scale agricultural enterprise  as tractor drivers, 
laboratory assistants, security staff, and farmhands. The LSE director had a good 
reputation among the interviewees and is generally referred to as a man who really 
cares for the community. He has been facilitating the resolution of conflicts regarding 
tenure and land use in the villages, such as pasture management and division of 
with a cooperative member: 
Have you met this LSE director? 
 Yes. He often talks with people; he has meetings with people. Cooperative 
members would meet him a lot. 




 Sometimes he meets ordinary people, sometimes he meets us laboratory 
assistants [milk collectors]. There was an argument about the pasture, there was 
some conflict, and he came. Someone wanted to retain their pai for private use, 
but it happened to be part of the pasture  so the director solved the issue by 
letting that person take another piece of land, so that the pasture could be intact 
for the use of the villagers.9 
So he takes some responsibility when it comes to village affairs? 
 He helps, he helps. There was a storm for example, it damaged the church and he 
helped to restore it. He helps all the churches where his lands are, financially. If 
somebody asks him for help regarding the church, he never refused. Maybe people 
have some personal problem with him, but most people are satisfied with him. 
Does he have any influence in the cooperative? 
 - the [cooperative] director is Mr NN, but I think [the LSE director] 
helps. He helps. He wanted to organize this project called Raspberry [another 
branch of the cooperative]. [They both] met with people and explained what it was 
about. 
(Interview 22) 
By its strong links to the large-scale agricultural enterprise and its director, it seems 
ooperative. 
His involvement in local affairs and major financial support to rural churches made 
villagers trust him (Field note diary, present author; Interview 22). He had also 
donated funds to restoring a historical local holy site and monastery.  
From meetings with villagers, it could be noted that cooperative members had 
difficulties differentiating between the cooperative and the large-scale agricultural 
enterprise (Field note diary, present author). One villager claimed she was collecting 
milk under the large-
cooperative, but when I asked the cooperative about this, they said that she was 
working for them. Partly, this mix up could be semantic. Contemporary large-scale 
agricultural enterprises are generally referred to as kolhosps among villagers10  (Field 
note dairy, present author). 
 
9 The pai is the land plot which was divided among former workers of kolhosps.  





The difficulties the milkwoman had in distinguishing was quite understandable. A 
reading of the field diary concludes that it was difficult to determine exactly where 
the lines between the cooperative and the large-scale agricultural enterprise were 
drawn. For example, the milk trucks which picked up the milk at the stations carried 
the logo of the large-scale agricultural enterprise, and the cooperative headquarters 
 
In a way, one can argue that the Buchach cooperative has no trust issues, due to its 
ablished institutions and 
actors to quickly gain the trust of villagers, can also be seen in another way. One can 
argue that there in fact is little trust for the cooperative, but completely dependent on 
its links to the LSE. Hence, the cooperatives dependencies are twofold, relying on the 




Though trust is needed for recruiting members, a cooperative also needs to ensure 
that their members are committed to the cause, and that they do not undermine the 
cooperatives functions.  
6.4.1.  
As shown earlier, the director was mainly driven by a strong commitment to her 
continued and is seen both in how board members reflect about the cooperative as 
well as in the pathways the cooperative has chosen. 
When speaking to the board and management in the cooperative, many describe the 
cooperative in terms that suggest that they have a strong sense of community among 
the members. The daughter of the Director says: 
(Interview 6). 
Another influential woman in the cooperative described how a couple of years ago 
the board had voted to reinvest funds from the cooperative into the wider community. 
This meant the end of a ´feedback mechanism´ that had previously worked to return 
a bonus at the end of the year to farmers who had made significant contributions in 
terms of quantity provided. This mechanism had been put in place to incentivize 




Interestingly, this family-farmer had pushed for this change towards investments in 
the wider community even though her own farm, housing twelve cows, would be in 
position for the biggest profit feedback. Along with others on the board, she argued 
for the money to be reinvested in the community. Among other things, they have since 
managed to pay for a reparation of br
room, and they have helped local churches with funds.  
-oriented policy of reinvesting in collective 
-incentivizing policy, reaffirms the management 
style in the cooperative as being socially rather than business-oriented  not only in 
-oriented aspects that do exist in the 
cooperative may be influenced by the foreign NGOs project plan which aims to 
increase the number of family farms specializing in dairy in Ukraine (Government of 
Canada 2015) 20 households in the cooperative have been willing to take the step and 
commit to full-time dairy production (Field note diary, present author). In 
cooperatives, such initiatives can become a source of conflict as the interests between 
big farms and smaller ones may differ (Bijman 2016). I asked the director: 
Int:  I reckon that the development of family farms is important in this cooperative, do 
you still see interest of people to become family farmers? 
Resp:  We are working to get more family farmers, but we have no right whatsoever to 
evict people who have only one or two cows. The idea of the cooperative is to 
provide support for everybody, because sometimes people who have only one or 
two cows, the money they get from milk is the main money they have, the bulk of 
their income. I understand that the advisory board has set the goal to have as many 
family farms as possible, but [it is] not ours. But as long as I am leader, I will never 
let them forget about the simple small farmer with one cow. But I try to support 
small farmers and family farmers the same way, no matter what [the Canadians] 
say. Maybe it is wrong from a business point of view, but if you look at a family 
farm, they have a stable regular income. For people with 2-3 cows, this is their 
only income, and my job is to help them and protect them.  
Director of the Brody cooperative (Interview 17) 
Here, it is evident that the director regards herself as responsible for defending the 
interests of the small farmers and is even willing to go against the more business-
oriented recommendations of the donor organization.  
6.4.2.  
At the time of the interviews, the cooperative and the co-op union of which it is part 




the milk to ensure better payment for the members. In this aspiration, the foreign 
sponsor has been willing to co-fund the dairy plant with the requirement of 20 % of 
sell through the cooperative to ensure that the dairy plant reaches a profitable volume 
of production. Interestingly, the foreign NGO project and the cooperative union 
leadership are having difficulties implementing these requirements: 
 dairy   
What kind of penalties have you discussed for breaking this contract?  
 
a have very big volume of milk can write an obligation for [delivering] 100 litres. 
armers [just care about] the risks, and 
penalties and obligations, the fear might take over and oh 
really believe in the idea of the plant. Some volunteers invest in it. We can clearly 
see that this cooperative dairy plant is a new and strange idea for many farmers. 
 
Director of the Cooperative Union (Interview 1) 
It is evident that part of the trust issues seen in the initial stages of cooperative 
-awareness and fear of 
binding contracts. This hampers the ability of the cooperative to invest in a future 
collective goal. The inability to convince members to commit to this goal is also 
de jure binds 
members to sell their milk through the cooperative. This effectively means that they 
are not enforcing the rules to hinder side-selling, one of the biggest internal threats 
to cooperatives (Bijman 2016). 
llagers is evident 
in how open it is to outsiders using its services. To use some of the cooperative 
services, one does not have to pay the initial membership fee, such as to use the co-
op milk refrigerator and testing devices, or even sell through the cooperative 
(Interview 10). However, other services such as access to credit and forage are limited 
to members only. This openness is a policy to make farmers familiarize themselves 
with the cooperative and earn their trust (Interview 17). Attracting non-members is 
of interest since it allows the cooperative to reach higher quantities and thereby 




In this cooperative, members can side-sell outside of the cooperative without 
repercussions while non-members can sell through the cooperative without fulfilling 
the obligations of membership. As the cooperative attempts to compensate for a 
decrease in quantity due to side-selling, the involvement of non-members in joint 
cooperative sales could potentially also risk exacerbating the very commitment issues 
-selling in the first place. By not drawing clear 
boundaries regarding membership, the cooperative can risk undermining its ability 
to build organizational identity and a sense of community that causes members to 
commit to their cause. By not making the membership exclusive, the cooperative may 
 
6.4.3.  
There is some tension among certain members of the Brody cooperative. Three key 
family farms (with 10 -12 cows) have decided not to sell through the cooperative 
anymore (Interview 12, Interview 13, Interview 14), and another one with eight cows 
said that she would sell on the side if she had the opportunity (Interview 7). This is 
remarkable, as the cooperative and the foreign sponsor through their investments 
and advice is what made many family farms possible in the first place. One 
interviewed smallholder said she was side-selling (Interview 15). 
When asked about their reasons for side-selling, all but one seemed to have 
abandoned the cooperative as they were unhappy with certain aspects of the 
management. The first issue is related to what these perceived as a lack of 
transparency regarding the economic decisions taken by the management. The other 
issue lies in what some members experience as power concentration in the 
cooperative. Two of the farmers had opposing ideas of how the cooperative should be 
run, but thought their complaints were hastily shut down (Interview 14, Interview 
25). 
One family farmer was very sceptical to the accounting procedures and transparency 
in the cooperative:  
 he rules in February saying that I need to pay 20 
kopeks more per litre to the cooperative. I was opposing it, and the other family 
farmers were opposing it, but since the majority of the cooperative owners are 
small scale, they voted and supported the ame





 The director would bring the report to me, 
just like she would to you, but you know that the numbers are such that you can 
enter any numbers in the reports.  
 
 




contracts as far  
Do you think they are hiding something? 
 If they were not hiding something, they would make the documents open to 
 
d 
disclose the information? 
 Almost no backing, because in the board, nobody knows how to do bookkeeping. 
 
(Interview 14) 
Although valuing the reliability of at times rumour-like claims regarding whether the 
director is 
scope of this thesis, one can point out that the lack of transparency is hurting the trust 
towards the cooperative for some members, and therefore, their commitment to 
continue subscribing to its services. 
One farmer, with a degree in business economics brought forward an informed 
critique of transparency and accounting procedures  the view of an accounting 
professional requesting more insight. His concerns about lack of transparency are 
however shared with other members who do not possess the same technical 
competence. A member who previously served on the board and believes she lacks 
the necessary understanding regarding the economics of the cooperative tells of her 
experience: 
Do you think it requires a lot of competence to be part of the board? 
 I think so. You have to be competent. I cannot even express myself. Some people 
joined the board earlier, they know more as they have been on the board for 





Because you said that people vote unanimously, are there some disagreements that are not 
shown when people vote? 
 
everything if the price fo
cooperative;  
(Interview 9) 
However, there appears to be some dissatisfaction with aspects of the cooperative 
governance among several members regardless of professional competence. While 
expressing doubts about her competence to serve on the board, Steff also seemed to 
have felt resignation toward aspects of the governance, exemplifying with unanimous 
voting. This brings us to the second critique raised towards the cooperative. Some 
members describe a concentration of power in the cooperative with the leadership 
centred around the director since she started the cooperative and is now acting as the 
executive director (Interview 13, 14, 25 and 7).  
A person at the advisory council had a similar impression. He points to the fact that 
the director, by being stubborn and having created great success for the cooperative, 
has managed to create a cooperative that in many ways circle around her motivations. 
In his words: as executive director, she not only affects herself and other members, she 
also has influence on the board members. So, members of the cooperative perceive her 
not only as an executive director, but as the head of the cooperative (Interview 25). The 
advisor is referring to the internal structure that a cooperative should have  that the 
board should be represented by members, and that the board members should be 
able to hold the executive director accountable. In his interpretation, the executive 
director holds power and influence over the board members, which is problematic. 
According to the disgruntled members, their influence is limited by people who, 
rather than being critical, follow the leader. This claim is somewhat supported by the 
advisory services (Interview 25). They are both under the impression that the rest of 
the board members are not acting critically towards their director, but loyal to what 
they regard as their leader. 
 Because there are some people who have their own ambitions, they want to be 
involved in the decision-making process too, and their proposal is different from 
the proposals of the director who has another understanding of the situation. And 
her experience and authority exert pressure on others. 




The backside of having an organization built so strongly by one individual with strong 
conviction is that it may have some influence on the cooperative. Interestingly, what 
first managed to make the cooperative possible  building trust through ambition and 
conviction of one woman  seems to also have caused the current discontent. While 
her leadership surely must have been necessary to develop the cooperative, the 
network that she has built around her seems to have been cemented in the 
cooperative in a way that may hinder other ambitious persons with other ideas.  
 
6.4.4.  
One area that the cooperative has been successful in enforcing rules for the collective 
good is within ensuring milk quality. By having small testing devices for analysis, 
cooperative members have been able to get credible and direct information of the 
quality of their milk. As shown in the previous chapter, the practices of the local dairy 
plants were delivering results that were cheated with rather than exact, seldom 
conducted instead of daily, distant instead of direct, and collective rather than 
individual. Understandably, this would not give farmers any incentive to increase 
their quality, and if they tried it would be impossible for them to judge their own 
performance in doing so. 
With the device, the cooperative offers an individual price that scales with the milk 
quality. Paired with training, many farmers argue that they have been able to learn 
new practices for quality improvement while also seeing somewhat direct results of 
changes in practice. 
 
6.4.5.  
Brody had a dual organizational identity, where business was one part, but with 
especial emphasis on the social and egalitarian value. However, in Buchach, it leaned 
more towards a business identity. Many of the members interviewed described the 
cooperative in straight-
exclusively the economic aspects of the organization:  
What would you say is the most important role of the cooperative?  
 The job is to ensure that they get high quality milk, and they sell it to whomever 
 






People never likened the cooperative to a family, and as we can see in the quote above, 
they were discussing the cooperative, as with the Brody cooperative. 
 
Side selling in Buchach 
However, this cooperative, with its less democratic structure and more business-like 
goals, also had a more authoritative manner through which it ran its operations. I had 
this discussion with the director of the cooperative: 
 At the beginning, when we came to different villages, there were different 
situations. They would come with 5 litres of milk, 15 litres of water and bring two 
dily exercise, carrying buckets for 
kilometres  
it on paper, then everything is entered here in the computer. This column 
demonstrates the number of litres, fat  and water- if they brought water. If a 
woman brings 10 % of water, the whole village then would be counted as having 
 
It is collective punishment? 
 the next day everybody 
who brought milk waited by the collection point with guns loaded [he jokingly 
demonstrates how they would take aim]. If it would show 10 % again, they would 
all fire at the same time. In this way, we managed to eradicate these irresponsible 
people. Different things happen. When [our manager] drove the milk analysis 
equipment There will be no device here for three 
-of-a-gun; he brought it back the next day. There would 
always be two or th  
In this passage, the director explains the tough strategies it uses to ensure the goal of 
collecting quality milk. To attain the goal of collective action and reduce free-riding, it 
has taken quite strong means of enforcement, namely by using the collective 
punishment and by actively misleading villagers regarding the times that they will 
have their milk tested. 
This begs the question; has the cooperative members agreed to this? One can assume




governance and representation in the cooperative until recently, where they had 
lacklustre villager representation, but instead representation from the large-scale 
agricultural enterprise in the board of the cooperative (Interview 25). At their 
recommendation, the cooperative had changed its structure to ensure better villager 
representation. 
This indicates that the management in this aspect are not as fearful of going against 
members preferences as the Brody cooperative were  instead, they have overridden 
them in order to handle collective action problems related to side-selling. By using 
the strategy of collective punishment, the cooperative has actively magnified the 
collectiv





The purpose of this thesis has been to shine a light on institutional challenges and 
opportunities, specifically regarding issues of trust and commitment, in post-Soviet 
agricultural service cooperatives. From an academic point of view, cooperatives in the 
former USSR have been largely overlooked, mainly because of the lack of them. 
Cooperatives can offer smallholders in Ukraine higher incomes. As the results of this 
study suggests, it seems that they can also work to serve the needs of large-scale 
enterprises (LSEs) as well. The study has shown this by empirically examining two 
types of cooperatives in Ukraine  a conventional western style cooperative and a 
more unconventional  linked to a local LSE. 
I set out to study the  trust and commitment partly informed by Cechin et 
al's (2013) deconstruction of the concept into the aspects of hierarchy, democracy 
and community. The intention of the study  design was to focus less on the 
importance of market and economic incentive, but instead more on the organizational 
issues of the three latter aspects. The answers collected through interviews suggest 
that site 1 had a more democratic cooperative, which revolved around participation 
and equity, and a lower level of hierarchy, although criticism was raised of the 
governance being centred around the manager. The second cooperative had a much 
higher level of hierarchy, but an almost non-existent development of participation and 
democracy. However, before we move on to discuss the differences between the 
cooperatives, let us note the important similarities of the two. 
Though this study has focused on the differences between the cooperatives in relation 
to trust and commitment, there are some similar patterns between the two. Murray 
(2008) has stated that in low trust areas, it often boils down to individual efforts. This 
was certainly the case for both cooperatives, where the grassroots director in one 
cooperative  director were both essential for their 
development. The individuals who started the cooperatives were also linked to an 
NGO and an LSE respectively  organizations that were both necessary as catalysts 
and financiers of the respective cooperatives. Through them, the cooperatives could 






Of special importance were the investments in milk labs at every drop off point. This 
seems to have greatly affected the viability of the cooperatives. In both cooperatives, 
members often mentioned the ability to analyse s milk to control its fat as an 
important factor in both initial and continued trust towards the cooperatives, while 
also giving them an opportunity to improve their production. Before the cooperatives, 
such technology was not used by the farmers themselves, and in the few cases where 
buyers employed a milk fat bonus, the farmers could not monitor the process of milk 
control. 
Member relations and organizational identity 
Beside these common factors, the cooperatives have also displayed important 
differences. In the theory section, it was argued that cooperatives are a form of 
institutionalized collective action. The field data paints a complex picture of how the 
studied cooperatives have used different strategies to handle issues of trust and 
commitment in order to set up the collective action arrangements.  
One major difference was seen in the organizational identity between the 
cooperatives, pertaining to how members and leaders discussed and valued the role 
of the cooperative, its goals and purpose. The interviewees at the Brody cooperative 
regularly mentioned the uniting features of the cooperative. Many regarded the 
cooperative as a collective effort to improve their situation; an arena through which 
they could work together to reach common goals. Some members even seemed to 
regard the cooperative s testament to their ability to work together in itself as the 
prime achievement, rather than the instrumental value of increasing household 
income the cooperative membership had secured. 
The leadership and members at this site emphasized ideas of social mobilization and 
a strong care for community. Its leadership often stressed the ideas of the cooperative 
principles, which in many ways epitomize this social ethic. They tried to develop a 
broad organization, with members who participate actively in the many trainings and 
meetings held. These ideas and values are likely not entirely spontaneous  but should 
be expected to have been promoted through the close support and expertise of the 
foreign NGO. 
However, as other authors have noticed, organizing social movements in rural post-
Soviet contexts is difficult (Visser et al. 2015). The memories of failed or fraudulent 
that 
is difficult to overcome. In their desire to win over villagers to trust their cause, the 
Brody cooperative have tried to be  needs and wishes by 




responsive, they still have issues of distrust among some members, who believe the 
organization corrupt and serves only the interests of its director. 
Members at the contrasting cooperative in Buchach seemed to have a different 
understanding of their cooperative. In general, there was a more technical and 
-of-  approach in how members and management spoke about the 
cooperative. Members seemed to regard their responsibilities as limited simply to not 
selling milk of poor quality. This contrasts with the other cooperative where members 
saw active participation at meetings and trainings as their responsibilities. The 
members at Buchach only pointed to the increased milk price as the achievement of 
the cooperative. Social and community-oriented themes were not explicitly noted 
among neither members nor leadership in the ways of speaking about the 
. 
In my interpretation, this differing kind of organizational identity relates to how the 
Buchach cooperative possibly mimics t -  and vertical patterns of 
organization of the large farm enterprise. The cooperative had a professionalized 
management where both the cooperative manager and director were non-members 
with professional experience from the dairy industry and finance respectively. This 
may influence the general values and member relations of the cooperative.  
The data suggests that this cooperative functions as an extension of the local LSE. In 
that role, the cooperative works according to a business-like logic, where economic 
and more hierarchic rather 
than democratic governance model. The cooperative is structured with more vertical 
lines of organization, stricter membership boundaries as well as tougher sanctions on 
members who break the rules of the cooperative  including collective punishment. 
Furthermore, few members were informed of the decisions taken within the 
cooperative, and members did not consider themselves as having any power within 
it. Some interviewees also had difficulties distinguishing between the LSE and the 
cooperative. Members also seemed to have little understanding of the economy of the 
cooperative, and how much of the milk price that went to the cooperative s 
administration. Interestingly, no interviewed member at this cooperative seemed to 
harbour any distrust towards the management. Although the LSE director seemed to 
have ambitions of supporting his community, it differs a lot from the self-empowering 
themes seen in the Brody cooperative. 
Why do the organizational forms differ? 
There is reason to believe that the Buchach cooperative s more hierarchical 




background section, it was argued that LSEs (both current and in historically as 
kolhosps) are important institutions that structure rural economic and social life and 
relationships in Ukraine and other countries formerly in the USSR.  
 Based on the findings at the Buchach cooperative, this seems to be an example of such 
a relationship between the cooperative, its members vis-à-vis the LSE and its director, 
where the latter actors seem to influence many aspects of village life. Aside from being 
a major employer working many thousands of hectares, the director also actively 
handled land relations between villagers as well as reconstruction and maintenance 
of religious buildings. In the theory section, this kind of relationship was labelled 
patrimonial in how it revolves around one individual, in this case the LSE director, 
who expands reciprocal economic relations outside of the regular limits of the LSE. 
His patrimonial status seems to bestow the Buchach cooperative with a kind 
legitimacy that allowed it to side-step the tedious trust-building and recruitment 
phase that the Brody cooperative had to go through. 
Interestingly, the data indicate that the LSE supported cooperative not only had a 
 with trust in the start of the cooperative, but members also continued to 
uphold its management as trustworthy and its members committed  or at least not 
cheating or side-selling. This is interesting, as they have chosen a management 
strategy less based on participation and democracy, and more on hierarchy and 
enforcement. Generally, collective action theory tends to contend that democratic 
procedures increase the trust of the management 
& Nistotskaya 2017). 
It is however difficult to delve deeper into the differences in trust for the two 
cooperatives. One reason could be that the more hierarchical organization may deter 
members from cheating and side-selling, and that members value this policy a lot. 
They may be ensured that cheating and free-riding is not tolerated  even though 
harsh measures such as collective punishment may affect true members. In contrast, 
efforts to create and sustain trust in the Brody cooperative  responsiveness and less 
strict enforcement of rules  could have actually worked to undermine trust. 
The strong links to the development cooperation NGO seem to have led the Brody 
cooperative to place emphasis on the cooperative values and principles. This study 
heard from more critical members in the Brody cooperative, but this may relate to 
how stronger democratic practice and ideals may have taught members to be more 
outspoken and critical, as well as making them comfortable in freely voicing their 
concerns. 
Another reason may be related to a discrepancy between the highly held cooperative 




promoted in contrast with the perceived control of the director seem to have caused 
scepticism among the members. Likewise, the promotion of transparency as an 
important principle and the ability to deliver such transparency seem to fail to match 
when members notice issues with the numbers. The reason for these issues may well 
be related to competence rather than intention, it is difficult to conclude. Thus, 
upholding a cooperative management strategy and identity linked so strongly to the 
cooperative ideals may place higher demands on such cooperatives to avoid making 
mistakes. Further studies, preferably with a broader use of methods such as trust 
games, survey data and/or wider use of ethnography, could likely delve deeper into 
these questions regarding trust and commitment within organizations with 
cooperative strategies like those in Brody and Buchach. 
Implications of joint-venture cooperatives in Ukraine and other post-soviet countries 
The two studied cooperatives typify an ongoing discussion of the role of cooperatives 
today, in which traditional equity and socially-oriented cooperatives are giving way 
for new, more hierarchical, business-oriented cooperatives with a stronger emphasis 
on market integration, including higher quality control schemes to appease the needs 
of multinational food companies (cf. Bijman et al. 2016). Though the more traditional 
type of cooperative in this study clearly also brings meaningful effects to their 
members  both economically and socially, perhaps even politically  it is of 
theoretical importance to focus on the LSE-backed cooperative specifically. Let us 
extrapolate potential tendencies from here. 
Given that cooperatives have been seemingly difficult to establish in Ukraine  which 
the early struggles of the Brody cooperative also show  the effortlessness in which 
the Buchach cooperative has been able to recruit and grow to around 1200 members 
in just a couple of years is remarkable. It is not difficult to imagine that other LSEs, 
through patrimonial networks also have the capacity to set up cooperatives and use 
them to formally r value chains. 
With this said, not all LSE directors are necessarily seen as legitimate authorities. 
During my field visits, other directors of neighboring LSEs came up during interviews. 
  referring to whether 
they treated their workers well, how they handled their animals, whether they had 
agricultural competence and experience and to what level they were helping the 
responsibility
investments and management taking root in the Ukrainian agricultural sector. These 




Nevertheless, a process in which LSEs vertically integrate peasant household activity 
in their value chains could both offer opportunity and pose a risk for peasants in 
Ukraine. Finding socially and economically inclusive approaches to increase 
smallholder incomes that are appealing to the investment of private actors should be 
seen as an opportunity that could complement models dependent on NGO or state 
funds.. It is also likely that LSE support and business-like management seen in 
Buchach has a good chance to offer peasants entry to international markets. At 
Buchach, there were plans to develop a horticultural cooperative that could capitalize 
on the LSEs channels to a global market. 
The LSE involvement in Buchach does however seem to have come at the expense of 
social and community-oriented ideals. It can therefore be questioned whether such 
joint-venture cooperatives are able bring the often-cited benefits of cooperative 
engagement  linked to civic engagement, self-reliance and community services and 
public goods (c.f. Blokland & Schuurman 2016). At worst, joint venture cooperatives 
could be seen as yet another way of entangling farmers in stronger patrimonial 
dependence to large-scale agricultural enterprises, where cooperatives could be used 
to give LSE leverage over peasants. Scholars of agrarian change should study these 
new formalised relations and how they affect small holder empowerment. 
If LSE cooperatives continue to develop, lawmakers in Ukraine may need to 
distinguish between different types of cooperatives, to develop regulations and 
support that is appropriate for their respective needs and goals. Though cooperatives 
t another  economic arrangement, it is safe to say that they do 
carry the heritage of ideals regarding self-determination, independence and 
democracy. It could be wise for such ideals to be central in cooperative development, 
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This interview guide was developed before, and revised during, the field study. The 
interviews were semi-structured focusing on themes, but example questions that were 








Can you tell me about your first thoughts when heard about this cooperative? 
 Why did you join? 
Why do you think so others are joining the cooperative? 
Why are others choosing not to? 
How would you describe the cooperative? 
What is the most important role of the cooperative? [probing, clarifying] 
What do you think is the best part of being a member?     
What do you think is the worst/hardest part of being a member?   
Do you think these villages and communities have changed in any way with the start 
of the cooperative? 
In what way is it different to be part of, and sell milk to a cooperative, than to a milk 
plant? 
 
Learning and participation 
Can you describe in as much detail as possible a situation where you have learned 
something within the cooperative? 
After joining the cooperative, have you changed your farm operations in some way? 
Appendix I     
Interview guides 




 Why did you change that? 
Do you think it is important to learn things within the cooperative? 
What have you learned during your time in the cooperative? 
 
Questions on formalization: 
Has your milk ever been rejected when you wanted to sell it in the cooperative?  
[Exemplify, describe] 
Do you encounter situations where you would prefer something other than the 
cooperative prescribes? 
How do you feel about this/is this important to you? 
 
Questions on representation and governance: 
Do you have any influence over important decisions in the cooperative?  
Who/what groups have the most influence over the decisions in the cooperative? 
 Why do they have this power? 
Who have the least amount of influence in the cooperative, and why? 
Can you remember any specific disagreements/disputes within the cooperative?  
How are such disputes resolved? 
 
Closing questions 
What do you think the future holds for the cooperative? 
What are the challenges and opportunities? 







What did you do before you started working for/with the cooperative? 
How did the cooperative start? 
How did you become director/manager? 
What is the best part of being a director/manager? 
What is the most difficult part of being director/manager?  
How would you describe the atmosphere within the cooperative? 
Do you learn a lot from being a cooperative leader? 
What things do you learn? 
Commitment and trust 
 
What are the biggest reasons people are distrustful do you think? 
Do you feel that the commitment in the villages are differing? Why is that so? 
Representation 
How do you teach people about the cooperative principles? 
How do you get new people to join the board?  
As your cooperative has gotten larger and older, what has become more difficult?  
And what has become easier? 
Governance 
How has the relationship with the members developed? 
Has their expectations changed? 
Who have the least amount of influence in the cooperative, and why? 
Can you remember any specific disagreements within the cooperative?
Can you give an example/describe? 
How are such disputes resolved? 
How do you handle people who cheat/side sell? 
Ending 
What are the greatest challenges and opportunities? 
e been talking about? 
 
  




Table 2. List of interviews conducted. 
No. Location Date Participant description 
1 A 2019-04-12 Director of the Cooperative Union 
2 B 2019-04-16 Manager of the Brody cooperative 
3 B 2019-04-16 Smallholder 
4 B 2019-04-18 Villager who chose not to join 
5 B 2019-05-03 Former milk collector, keeping 2 cows 
6 C 2019-05-03 Milk collector and daughter to the director 
7 C 2019-05-03 Fermer keeping 8 cows. 
8 D 2019-05-03 Fermer keeping 10 cows. 
9 E 2019-05-13 Fermer keeping 12 cows. 
10 E 2019-05-13 Smallholder, non-member, keeping 2 cows 
11 F 2019-05-20 Fermer keeping 10 cows 
12 F 2019-05-20 Fermer keeping 12 cows. Town resident. 
13 G 2019-05-20 Fermer keeping 8 cows. 
14 H 2019-05-20 Fermer, economist.  
15 B 2019-05-31 Smallholder, keeping 3 cows. Side selling. 
16 B 2019-05-31 Director of Brody cooperative 
17 I 2019-06-03 Director of Buchach cooperative 
18 J 2019-06-03 Milk collector and smallholder, 2 cows 
19 K 2019-06-04 Milk collector and smallholder 
20 L 2019-06-04 Milk collector and smallholder 
21 M 2019-06-05 Milk collector and smallholder 
22 N 2019-06-05 Milk collector and smallholder 
23 O 2019-06-06 Mayor of 3 villages and board member 
24 P 2019-06-07 Manager 
25 A 2019-05-13 Advisory Services 
26 A 2019-04-22 Advisory Services 
27 B 2019-04-18 Smallholder 






Thank you for agreeing to meet with me for participation in a research project on 
agricultural cooperatives. This form describes the purpose of the study, the 
consequences of agreeing to participate, and your rights as a participant. 
The research project focuses on the challenges and successes of the emerging 
agricultural cooperatives in Ukraine. The study will examine different cooperatives 
across Ukraine in order to better understand how to strengthen cooperative 
participation and development. 
The study is carried out as a part of a thesis course given at the Department of Rural 
and Urban Development at the Swedish University for Agricultural Science. The 
discussions during interviews will be used in a thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Master of Science in Agriculture. The study is financed by a scholarship provided by 
the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida).  
Participating in the study is voluntary. Taking part in this study involves being 
interviewed and, if you agree, audio-recorded. The recording will only be heard by me 
and an independent translator for the purpose of this study. Your answers during the 
interview are important for the findings of the thesis. 
Together with answers from other participants, your answers will be much valuable 
for drawing conclusions in the thesis. Direct quotes from you may be used in the 
thesis, but no information that could identify you will be revealed. I will not collect 
any personal information about you as a participant. At this interview, I will only take 
your agricultural operations. 
The recording from the interview will be translated and transcribed into text. The 
recording and text documents will be stored safely. You are encouraged to ask 
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questions or raise concerns at any time during or after the interview about the nature 
of the study or the methods I am using. Please contact me at any time using the contact 
details listed below. 
You have the right to withdraw your participation in the study at any time until 
publication, during or after the interview. You also have the right to refuse answering 
specific questions during the interview. In the event you choose to withdraw from the 
study, all information you provide will be deleted and omitted from the thesis. No 
questions will be asked about the reasons for withdrawing participation. By giving 
consent, you certify that you have received and understood this information, and that 
you have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
